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Plyler v. Doe: Illegal Aliens and the
Misguided Search for Equal
Protection
By ScoTT

DAVID LIVINGSTON*

Introduction
The Texas Legislature in 1975 enacted a statute that withheld from
local school districts any state funds for the education of children who
were not "legally admitted" into the United States.' The statute also
expressly authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in their
public schools to such children, unless they paid tuition.2 In 1982, the
Supreme Court held that the Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Writing for the majority,4
Justice Brennan subjected the Texas statute to an intermediate level of
judicial scrutiny.5 The majority conceded that illegal aliens 6 are not a
*
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acknowledges the assistance of Professor Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., of the Duke University
School of Law, whose comments and criticism greatly improved this Article.
1. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
2. Id
3. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
4. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan in the
majority opinion. In addition, concurring opinions were filed by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.
5. 457 U.S. at 218 n.16, 223-26. In limited circumstances the Court requires that the
classification "[reflect] a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by
inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State."
Id at 217-18 (footnote omitted). As the Court observed, this is the "technique of'intermediate' scrutiny." Id at 218 n.16.
6. An illegal alien is descriptively synonymous with an undocumented alien. An undocumented person is an alien who is in the United States without proper documentation, as
a result of either having entered this country illegally or having gained entrance legally, and
subsequently violating the terms of that entry. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH
CONG., IST SESS., ILLEGAL ALIENS: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND 1 (Comm. Print 1977).
To be consistent and to avoid any euphemistic ambiguity, I will hereinafter refer to such
persons as illegal aliens.

[599]

600

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 11:599

suspect class,7 and that public education is not a fundamental right'
guaranteed by the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that an intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate, because Texas
had completely denied illegal alien children the right to an education, 9
the children were legally innocent,' ° and the right to an education,
while not fundamental, was of "supreme importance.""I Applying intermediate scrutiny, the majority found that this standard of review
was not satisfied because denial of free public education must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest, and
"[n]o such showing was made here."1 2
Dissenting Chief Justice Burger' 3 argued that because education is
not a fundamental right and illegal aliens are not a suspect class there
could be only one conclusion: the proper standard of review was the
minimum rational basis test. "4 The dissent reasoned that heightened
judicial scrutiny was unnecessary because "the importance of a governmental service does not elevate it to the status of a 'fundamental
rights,' "'5 and "the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude legislators from classifying among persons on the basis of factors and characteristics over which individuals may be said to lack 'control.' '"16
Finally, the dissent found that the Texas interest of fiscal conservation
was a legitimate goal furthered by the denial of free public education to
illegal aliens, 7 that the Texas statute was not irrational, and that this
should have been the limit of judicial inquiry.'
Like the Court's previous sojourns into the realm of social pol7. "We reject the claim that 'illegal aliens' are a 'suspect class.' No case in which we
have attempted to define a suspect class. . . has addressed the status of persons unlawfully
in our country." 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
8. Id at 223.
9. Id at 235 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
10. 457 U.S. at 219-20.
11. Id at 221-22 (citations omitted).
12. Id.at 230.
13. Chief Justice Burger was joined in his dissent by Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor. ld at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
14. "Once it is conceded-as the Court does-that illegal aliens are not a suspect class,
and that education is not a fundamental right, our inquiry should focus on and be limited to
whether the legislative classification at issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose." Id at 248 (citations omitted).
15. Id at 247.
16. Id at 245.
17. Id at 249-53.
18. Id at 252. The dissent also asserted that Texas had legitimate economic and demographic interests in reducing the level of illegal immigration across its borders and that the
denial of free education to such aliens was rationally related to the achievement of these
state objectives. Id at 249 n.10.
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icy,' 9 the decision in Plyler v. Doe was controversial. The Court failed
to settle the political debate and alleviate the adverse socioeconomic
consequences of illegal alien immigration. Adding only confusion to
an already incoherent and uncertain area of equal protection jurisprudence, the Court left unresolved nearly as many constitutional questions as it attempted to answer. The decision and the Court's failure to
establish comprehensible constitutional standards are especially worthy
of analysis because of what they portend for future adjudication in the
area of immigration and equal protection.
The validity of the holding is unclear. In light of settled constitutional precedents and compelling policy concerns which counsel
against judicial intervention, the decision in Plyler may represent an
unsound and inconsistent judicial mandate. Moreover, an issue of perhaps greater significance remains unsettled: Would an express congressional authorization permitting states to deny illegal aliens a free public
education survive constitutional attack under the formidable challenge
of equal protection?2"
This Article first asserts that the Texas statute should have been
subject to a less burdensome standard of scrutiny and that even under
the majority's intermediate level of scrutiny the statute should have
been upheld. The second part of the Article examines the unexplored
constitutional validity of a hypothetical congressional statute authorizing the states to deny illegal aliens a free public education. The conclusion argues for judicial restraint with respect to illegal aliens. An
exceptionally strong need for judicial restraint exists because of the
avoidable and intractable policital, social, and economic considerations
that must be analyzed before an appropriate and sound "legislative"
choice can be made. This task is solely the function of the legislative
branch.
I.
A.

In Search of a Standard: Questioning Ply/er v. Doe

The Proper Standard of Review Is Minimum Scrutiny

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative classifications is gener19. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the constitutional right of personal
privacy includes a pregnant woman's decision to have an abortion).
20. In Plyler, the majority did not address the constitutional validity of congressional
authorization of state imposition of tuition requirements for illegal aliens, although Justice
Brennan reluctantly suggested that "[i]n other contexts, undocumented status, coupled with
some articulable federal policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the treatment
of undocumented aliens." 457 U.S. at 226.
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ally appropriate only when a suspect class or a fundamental right is
involved.'

Although illegal aliens are not a suspect class, 22 they may

nevertheless be entitled to some form of heightened scrutiny if they
possess sufficient characteristics or indicia of suspectness to warrant
placement into a quasi-suspect class.23 Legislative classifications based
on gender have been the primary area of application for intermediate
judicial scrutiny.24 Although the suspect characteristics test for heightened judicial scrutiny is fraught with imprecision, the Court has repeatedly relied on it in determining whether to apply an elevated standard
of review to a statutory classification. 25 To obtain heightened review,
21. See id at 216-17. As one commentator explained the origin of heightened scrutiny,
"the Warren Court's new equal protection-strict scrutiny framework contained two major
elements: not only the 'suspect classifications' theme ... but also the position that intensive
review is justified when governmental action seriously burdens 'fundamental rights or interests. . . ."' G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 908 (10th ed.
1980). See also Hull, UndocumentedAliens and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of
Doe v. Plyler, 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 43, 61 (1981); Hull, UndocumentedAlien Children and
FreePublicEducation: An Analysis ofPlyler v. Doe, 44 U. PIT. L. REv. 409, 418-19 (1983);
Kane & Velarde-Mufioz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution: Limitations on State
Action Denying Undocumented Children Access to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 461, 482 (1978); Lichtenberg, Within the Pale: Aliens, IllegalAliens, and Equal Protection, 44 U. PiTr. L. REV. 351, 352 (1983); Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Equal Protection
Clause: The Effect ofPlyler v. Doe on Intermediate Scrutiny, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 321 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Effect ofPlyler v. Doe on Intermediate Scrutiny]; Note, Strict
Scrutiny and Rodriguez: Relative Versus Absolute Deprivation,9 Sw. U.L. REV. 217, 218-24
(1977); Note, A State Statute Which Denies an Education to UndocumentedAliens Is Unconstitutional-Doev. Plyler, 14 TEX INT'L L.J. 289, 304-05 (1979); Note, Equal ProtectionIntermediate Scrutiny Applied to Texas Statute Denying Education to Undocumented Children-Plylerv. Doe, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 313 (1983); Comment, Does the Constitution Guaranteea Free Public Education to UndocumentedAlien Children, 33 BAYLOR L.
REv.637, 642 (1981); Comment, State Statute Denying UndocumentedAliens Access to Free
PublicEducation Unconstitutional,Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982), 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 367, 371 (1982); UndocumentedAliens-EqualProtectionand the Right to a Free
PublicEducation: Doe v. Plyler, 33 ALA. L. REV. 181, 187 (1981); 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 787, 788-89 (1979); 28 VILL. L. REv. 198, 204 (1982).
22. 457 U.S. at 219 n.19. See also Gerety, Children in the Labyrinth: The Complexities
ofPlyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 379, 392 (1983) (aliens lack sufficient suspect characteristics to be deemed a suspect class); Case Note, Broadeningthe Boundaries of Intermediate
Scrutiny in Equal Protection Cases, 36 ARK. L. REv. 383, 395 (1983) (illegal aliens do not
constitute a suspect class because their status is voluntary and subject to change).
23. By this term, I mean that the class is not a traditional suspect class, which requires
strict judicial scrutiny, but is one for which many of the indicia of a suspect class are present.
As a consequence, judicial solicitude in some form of heightened scrutiny may be required.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality
opinion).
24. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Mathews v Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (rejecting the argument that
statutory classifications based on illegitimacy require strict scrutiny because many of the
suspect characteristics manifested by women and racial minorities are absent); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (women are a suspect class insofar
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the disadvantaged -class need not exhibit all recognized indicia of suspectness that gender distinctions possess. Nor does the failure of the
class to possess a specific suspect characteristic preclude intermediate
scrutiny. Thus, the real question is whether illegal aliens possess sufficient suspect characteristics (such as those exhibited by women and il26
legitimate children) to warrant intermediate review.
1. Illegal Aliens Lack the Requisite Class CharacteristicsNecessaryfor
Intermediate Scrutiny
The following reasons have been offered by the Court to justify
heightened scrutiny for gender based classifications: (1) the high visibility and immutability of the sex characteristic; (2) the long history of

discrimination against women; (3) the obvious underrepresentation of
women in our nation's decisionmaking councils; and (4) the observation that gender frequently bears no relation to the ability to perform or

to contribute to society.27 These justifications for applying an interme-

diate standard of review to gender discrimination against women are

not, however, applicable to illegal aliens.
Illegal alien status is not a highly visible characteristic; such individuals are indistinguishable from legal resident aliens and native born
or naturalized U.S. citizens. Illegal aliens may be black or white, Mexican or Canadian, young or old, male or female, Catholic or Protestant.

No apparent distinguishing characteristic exists that invariably or even
generally indicates illegal alien status.28 Likewise, to the extent that
illegal aliens eventually may become naturalized U.S. citizens or legal
as they possess many of the traditional suspect characteristics used to justify strict scrutiny
for racial classifications); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(wealth is not a suspect classification because it lacks "the traditional indicia of suspectness"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (legalaliens are a suspect class for
the purpose of equal protection review of state legislative classifications because of the presence of sufficient suspect characteristics). The suspect characteristics test for heightened judicial scrutiny owes its genesis to a famous footnote authored by Justice Stone in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4. (1938) (political impotency may be a condition warranting more searching judicial inquiry). In the absence of a fundamental right,
equal protection analysis initially requires a determination of whether the necessary suspect
characteristics are present to permit heightened scrutiny of the statute. Once this determination is made, the statutory classification is reviewed under the appropriate level of scrutiny
(either minimum, intermediate, or strict scrutiny).
26. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 21, at 898 (asking the same question for the class of
illegitimates).
27. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-88 & 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion).
28. It is important to note the vast difference between a legally created and recognized
characteristic of illegality (i.e., lack of documentation) and physical characteristics such as
race and sex. The former is created by legislative command, whereas the latter are genetic
and unalterable. Even within the ever-widening frontier of equal protection, such a material
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resident aliens, or leave the United States, their illegal status is not an
immutable characteristic.2 9 Unlike the indelible distinctions of gender
and race, the illegal alien may unilaterally and voluntarily alter his
30
often ephemeral status.
Illegal aliens, like many legal aliens, have suffered from a long and
frustrating history of discrimination in the United States. Against a
history of nativism, illegal aliens have struggled for even grudging toleration.3 1 In this respect, illegal aliens have experienced discrimination similar to that endured by women. 32 But this is where the
similarity ends. Some Supreme Court Justices have legitimately decried the fact that women are grossly underrepresented in our government. 3 This concern, however, simply has no relevance to illegal
aliens because they are not citizens, they cannot vote, 34 and they have
no claim to representation in Congress or the state legislatures. 35 Addidifference in the nature of a group characteristic or basis for classification cannot be deemed
a "constitutional irrelevancy." Plyler,457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
29. Id at 222 n.20. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 558 S.W.2d
121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) ("the status of an illegal alien is hardly an unalterable or
unchangeable one"). .See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Note, The Effect ofPlyler v. Doe on Intermediate Scrutiny,supra note 21, at
326; Comment, Equal Protection and the Education of Undocumented Children,34 Sw. L.J.
1229, 1243 (1980).
30. Unless apprehended and deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the illegal alien is the master of his status. If he remains in the United States, his presence
continues to violate federal law. But if he returns home his illegal status is removed. See
Comment, Does the Constitution Guarantee Free Public Education to Undocumented Alien
Children, supra note 21, at 647.
31. Americans have overwhelmingly opposed illegal immigration. Specifically, "[tihe
Roper Poll of June 1980 found that 91% of all Americans support an 'all-out effort' to stop
illegal immigration, and 80% want to reduce the number of legal immigrants and refugees
accepted each year." Martin & Houstoun, European and American Immigration Policies,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1982, at 29, 44.
32. "There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(citing M. GRUBERG, WOMEN IN AMERICAN POLITICs 4 (1968); 2 A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Reeves trans. 1948)).
33. See, e.g., Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 n.17.
34. Even lawfully admitted aliens may be denied the right to vote. Skafte v. Rorex, 191
Colo. 399, 553 P.2d 830 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 961 (1977). See also Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
35. Aliens are not members of the "political community." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. at 647-49; Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 296; accordAmbach v. Norick, 441 U.S. 68,
74 (1979); see also Note, A DualStandard/orState DiscriminationAgainst Aliens, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1516, 1518 (1979). Thus, even though illegal aliens are politically impotent, they are
not entitled to heightened scrutiny of laws classifying them on the basis of their status because they represent a "group whom our Constitution and federal government does not
recognize as having any political rights." Comment, Does the Constitution Guarantee a Free
Public Education to Undocumented Alien Children, supra note 21, at 647.
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tionally, although gender frequently bears no relation to the ability to
perform or to contribute to society, this is not true with respect to illegal
aliens. As a direct result of their illegal status, aliens avoid activities
that might reveal their status and lead to their potential deportation.3 6

Such limited and cautious conduct necessarily inhibits the contribution
of illegal aliens to American society. Since they are entirely outside the

political community,37 they are unable to make any significant political
contribution to society. Moreover, because many illegal aliens are un-

skilled, illiterate, and indigent,38 their economic contribution to society
arguably is less than that of U.S. citizens. Accordingly, illegal aliens,
unlike women, lack the requisite class characteristics that justify intermediate scrutiny of statutory classifications that deny them benefits liberally granted to citizens.3 9
2. Education Is Not a FundamentalRight
Although the majority in Plyler conceded that education is not a

fundamental right,4" its application of intermediate scrutiny belied its
rhetoric. Because illegal aliens are not a suspect class, 4 1 the Court in
36. See Martin & Houstoun, supra note 31, at 48; Fogel, IllegalAliens: Economic Aspects andPublic PolicyAlternatives, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 63, 66 (1977); Seller, Historical
Perspectives on American ImmigrationPolicy: Case Studies and CurrentImplications,LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1982, at 137, 159.
37. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
38. Illegal Mexican aliens have an average education of only 4.9 years and earn an
average monthly wage of $424. Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates of IlegalAliens in
the United States, 1970-1981, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1982, at 223, 252. Some
studies in Texas have found that the average hourly earnings for illegal aliens is below the
minimum wage. Waldinger, The Occupationaland Economic Integration of the New Immigrants, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1982, at 197, 210. Illegal aliens in the United
States are generally employed as farm laborers or factory workers. See Seller, supra note 36,
at 157.
39. It is clear that illegal aliens live an impoverished existence in the United States. See
Kane & Velarde-Mufioz, supra note 21, at 468. But mere indigency, however worthy of
judicial compassion and deserving of private altruism, does not constitute a suspect class for
the purpose of equal protection review. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973). Those economically disadvantaged have never been declared a suspect class because the traditional indicia of suspectness are clearly absent. Id Much like the equal protection cul-de-sac reached when one attempts to analogize the plight and status of illegal
aliens to the suspect characteristics exhibited by women in search of heightened scrutiny, the
unquestioned impoverishment of illegal aliens does not invoke more rigorous scrutiny by
itself. But see Hull, UndocumentedAliens andthe Equal Protection Clause, supranote 21, at
56-58.
40. Plyler,457 U.S. at 221.
41. Id at 219 n.19; see also supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text. Although the
majority carefully drafted its opinion to avoid expressly elevating education to the status of a
fundamental right, its inability to label the class "suspect" caused it to accord education a
fundamental character to invoke heightened scrutiny. There was no alternative by which to
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Ply/er had to accord education a "fundamental" status, in effect to justify a more exacting scrutiny of the Texas statute.
Justice Brennan read San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez4 2
too narrowly when he limited its application to cases in which only a
disparity in the quality of education between classes exists, rather than
a complete denial of education to one class. In San Antonio, an equal
protection claim was brought against a Texas property tax that supported local school districts because it led to a gross disparity in the
amount of education funds available in poor and affluent districts.4 3
There was no absolute denial of the right to an education. While the
deprivation of the "right" was only relative, the disparity in educational financing available was immense between some districts. 4 The
Court plainly held that "[e]ducation. . .is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor [do we]
find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. 4 5 Despite this
forceful proclamation, the majority in Pyler limited the holding in San
Antonio to the particular facts in that case.46 In doing so, it enigmatically neglected the obvious-SanAntonio was concerned with the variation in the quality of education provided citizens, not illegal aliens.47
Significant logical inconsistencies and problems of judicial policy
are presented by holding that education is a fundamental right when
absolutely deprived, but not when there is merely a relative deprivation
of educational opportunity. 'The emerging concept of "fundamental
rights" in the area of equal protection subsumes the notion that either a
right is fundamental or it is not. Any attempt to raise a right to the
level of "fundamental," without expressly recognizing it as such, strains
the meaning of "fundamental" beyond its commonly accepted limits.
subject the Texas statute to intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the Court essentially found that
education was a quasi-fundamental right differing from traditional fundamental rights only
insofar as the former are subject to mere intermediate scrutiny, whereas the latter are reviewed under strict scrutiny. See Pvler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
43. Id
44. In San Antonio, the amount of funds available for education in the Edgewood Independent School District equaled only $356.00 per pupil, whereas the Alamo Heights Independent School District had available more than $594.00 per pupil. Id at 12-13.
45. Id at 35.
46. "Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of education opportunities to any of its children, that argument
provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative
differences in spending levels are involved ......
Id at 37. The Court here was merely
indicating for the purpose of argument that education might be a fundamental right if totally
denied.
47. Id passim.
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If a right is merely "somewhat important" or even "extremely salutary," it is notfundamentaland should not invoke heightened scrutiny.
An example illustrates the inconsistency inherent in the absolute
deprivation rationale used to accord education a fundamental character in Ply/er. The Court has long held that the right to vote is fundamental. 48 As a consequence, any deprivation of the right to votewhether complete or partial-will be subject to strict scrutiny upon review.4 9 Had the Texas legislature enacted a statute that made the vote
of green-eyed citizens worth only three-fourths the vote of nongreeneyed citizens, the Court would quickly declare the statute unconstitutional under strict scrutiny. That the right to vote was only relatively
deprived would make no difference because the right impinged upon is
fundamental. Similarly, the fact that illegal aliens may be absolutely
deprived of a free education (to the extent that they cannot pay the
required tuition) does not magically transform education into a fundamental right."
If education is a fundamental right when it is deprived absolutely
rather than relatively, the Court openly invites subterfuge by the Texas
legislature. For example, the Texas legislature might enact a statute
that permits local school districts to instruct nontuition-paying illegal
aliens only during the summer recess. Under such a statute, the illegal
alien children only would be relatively deprived of their right to an
education. It could hardly be argued, however, that the illegal alien
children truly were receiving an education in any meaningful sense.
Perhaps the Court would strike down such a statute on the ground that
the immense relative deprivation effectively amounts to an absolute
deprivation of the right to an education. But if so, where will the admittedly arbitrary line ultimately be drawn? Fundamental rights are
far too important to the individual to be premised on a reasonless foundation erected solely on arbitrary lines of distinction.
To circumscribe the holding in San Antonio as the majority in Pyler did requires that (1) excessive emphasis be given to dicta not intended to limit the holding; (2) the Court ignore the illegal status of the
aliens affected by the Texas statute; and (3) the Court disregard the
logical inconsistencies inherent in according education a fundamental
48. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667
(1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886).
49. See supra note 48.
50. P1vler, 457 U.S. at 247-48 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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character." In Ply/er, Justice Brennan strongly emphasized the importance of education as an indispensable ingredient in the development
of a child in our complex society.52 But education's undisputed significance does not raise it to the level of a fundamental right because "the
importance of a service performed by the State does not determine
whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause." 53 Regardless of the importance of a governmental benefit such as education, the benefit does not
Opsofacto become a fundamental right, nor does it require heightened
54
scrutiny.

3. EducationalLegislation Is Entitled to Greater JudicialDeference than
State Immigration Legislation
It is well established that immigration law and policy are primarily
within the province of Congress. The Supreme Court historically has
deferred to Congress in the field of immigration regulation, while subjecting comparable state legislation to a much higher standard of scrutiny. 6 The Texas statute in Plyler, however, principally concerned
public education, not immigration policy. Consistent with this description of the underlying character of the Texas statute, one commentator
51. Id But see id.at 235 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Cf.Kane & Velarde-Mufioz, supra
note 21, at 489-90 (avoids inconsistencies by distinguishing Ply/er from San Antonio).
52. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-23.
53. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 30.
54. "[T]he undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart
from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation." Id at 35.
The importance of a service is irrelevant with respect to the standard of judicial review
because it cannot seriously be contended "that education is more 'fundamental' than food,
shelter, or medical care." Ply/er,457 U.S. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Note,
Plyler v. Doe-EducationandIllegalAlien Children,8 BLACK L.J. 132, 136 (1983). Yet this
is exactly what the majority in Plyler accomplished by according education a fundamental
character, even though there is no fundamental constitutional right to food, shelter, and
other human necessities. In addition, the frequently asserted argument that a governmental
benefit may become a fundamental right to permit the effective exercise of a constitutional
right is not relevant to illegal aliens. Numerous cases have held that an alien must have the
right to work, or otherwise he cannot enjoy and exercise any of the constitutional rights that
have been granted to him. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 418-20 (1947); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 42 (1915). But even if education is a prerequisite to admittance into the political community and to the effective exercise of the right to vote, illegal aliens need not be provided an
education because the Constitution grants these rights only to citizens. See supra note 35.
55. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
56. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86-87 (1976); Note, Plyler v. Doe: Equal Protectionfor Illegal Aliens, 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 143, 154 (1982); Note, The Equal Treatment of
Aliens.- Preemption or Equal Protection, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1982); Note, Constitutional
Law-Equal Protection-Plylerv. Doe, 28 VILL. L. REV. 198, 209 (1982).
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has concluded that with respect to illegal aliens "[j]ust as the health cost
problem presents a public health dilemma, the school problem is an
educational cost problem rather than an immigration concern. 57
The courts unqualifiedly have recognized that "[e]ssentially and
intrinsically, the schools in which are educated and trained the children
who are to become the rulers of the commonwealth are matters of state,
and not of local, jurisdiction.""8 Consonant with this notion of local
autonomy and control over education, the Supreme Court has noted
that "[p]roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of the function
of a State .

. . .""

Accordingly, any "'[jjudicial interposition in the

operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems
requiring care and restraint . ...

' "60

Accepting the characterization

of the Texas statute as educational, it should have been subjected to
less exacting scrutiny by the Court when it required illegal aliens to pay
tuition for their education because "[t]he public school system in
America is a creature of the individual states." 6 '
4. IllegalAliens Are Not Similarly Situated with Citizens
It is fundamental that "[tihe equal protection clause guarantees

that similar individuals will be dealt with in a similar manner by the
government."6 2 No more is required and no less is permitted. The
Equal Protection Clause has no substantive content. 63 Judicial solici57. Abrams, American Immigration Policy: How Strait the Gate?, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1982, 107, 117.

58. State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 465, 23 N.E. 946, 947 (1890).
59. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). Recently, the Supreme Court has
emphatically declared that "[t]he provision of primary and secondary education. . . is one
of the most important functions of local government." Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321,
329 (1983). See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974); SanAntonio, 411 U.S.
at 50.
60. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 398 U.S.
97, 104 (1968)); see also San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 42.
61. Note, The Right to Education: .4 ConstitutionalAnaysis,44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796, 797
(1975). For additional authority that public education is solely entrusted to state and local
governments see Catz & Lenard, FederalPreemption andthe 'Right" of Undocumentedf41ien
Children to a Public Education: 4 PartialRepy, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 909, 928 (1979);
Comment, Does the Constitution Guaranteea Free Public Education to Undocumented Alien
Children, supra note 21, at 646; Case Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Equal Protection-Charge
of Tuition to Illegal Alien School Children Pursuantto Texas Statute Violates Fourteenth
Amendment, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 549, 557 (1979).
62. G. GUNTHER, supra note 21, at 678. See Pyiler,457 U.S. at 216 (1982) (quoting F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
63. The Supreme Court has cautioned that it cannot "'create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.'" City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980) (quoting San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 33). Because there is no substantive
content to equal protection, it is "the basis of the differential treatment andnotthe character
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tude is therefore unwarranted when individuals treated dissimilarly by
the government are not similarly circumstanced.6 4 Illegal aliens and
citizens are not "similar individuals" for purposes of equal protection
analysis. Justice Cardozo articulated reasons for differentiating between citizens and aliens in the allocation of governmental benefits that
remain logically valid and legally relevant today:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination, indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination; for the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the advancement and profit of
the members of the state. Ungenerous and unwise such discrimination may be. It is not for that reason unlawful ....
The state, in determining what use shall be made of its own
moneys, may legitimately consult the welfare of its own citizens,
rather than that of aliens. Whatever is a privilege, rather than a
right, may be made dependent upon citizenship. In its war
against poverty, the State is not required to dedicate its own resources to citizens and aliens alike. I
Afortiori,when such aliens are illegal aliens, the state has an even more
compelling reason to distinguish between citizens and legal aliens on
the one hand and illegal aliens on the other, regarding the distribution
of governmental benefits. Illegal alien status cannot justifiably be
deemed a "constitutional irrelevancy. '66 Nor can the ultimate consequence of such a tainted status be regarded lightly. The significance of
an illegal alien's status has been frequently recognized:
[H]e is not entitled to benefits. An illegal alien who enters the
United States without inspection in violation of 8 United States
Code Section 1251 is subject to deportation. His entry is illegal
of the particularinterest abridged[that] determines the applicability of the principle of equal
protection .... " Perry, Equal Protection,JudicialActivism, and the IntellectualAgenda of
Constitutional Theory: Reflections on, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 329,
340 (1983) (emphasis original). But see Lichtenberg, supra note 21, at 362-63.
64. For example, there is no substantive constitutional right to an education. But once
the state provides education, the Equal Protection Clause demands that the state provide the
same educational opportunity to all individuals similarly circumstanced. See Plller,457
U.S. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
65. People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 161-64, 108 N.E. 427, 429-30, afd,239 U.S. 195
(1915). For more recent decisions, see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (state may
exclude aliens from becoming public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978) (state may preclude aliens from serving as state policemen). The Court has, however,
placed limits on the extent to which aliens may be treated dissimilarly, especially regarding
the right to employment. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) (aliens cannot be excluded from the practice of civil engineering); In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973) (aliens cannot be excluded from the bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973) (aliens are not excludable from state competitive civil service employment).
Without exception, however, these decisions did not address the validity of statutes restricting the rights of illegal aliens-a far more compelling case for dissimilar treatment.
66. Plyler,457 U.S. at 223.
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and any subsequent acts done by him in this country would be in
furtherance of that illegal entry. To allow an illegal alien to collect unemployment benefits would reward him for his illegal entry into this country. In essence, his entry into this country is
fraudulent, and
as such he should not be allowed to profit from
67
his illegal act.
To the extent that obedience to the law must be given significance, the
difference between an illegal and a legal alien is neither chimerical nor

arbitrary.68
Although not alone dispositive, the lack of similarity between illegal aliens and citizens or lawfully resident aliens cannot be ignored.6 9
Such an obvious difference in status under the law strongly supports
the conclusion that the Texas statute should have been subjected to

only the minimum level of scrutiny.
5.

Legal Innocence of Illegal Alien Children Does Not Require Special
JudicialSolicitude

A major premise of the majority's argument in Plylerwas that the
Texas statute "impose[d] its discrminatory burden on the basis of a
67. Alonso v. State, 50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 253-54, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536, 544 (1975). See
also Burrafato v. United States Dep't. of State, 523 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1975) (illegal alien
does not have standing to assert due process violation based on a denial of his visa application); Pilapil v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 424 F.2d 6, 11 (10th Cir. 1975) (nonimmigrant alien student has no constitutional right to work without authorization); Hernandez
v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (statute allowing
tuition-free education for illegal alien children is constitutional). But see Ayala v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. App. 3d 676, 680, 126 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (1976) (state
could not deny unemployment benefits to an alien solely because he was in the United States
illegally).
68. To argue that the illegal status given undocumented aliens is immaterial would require a presumption that congressional classifications in the area of immigration are inconsequential. No court has been willing to go this far. Plyler,457 U.S. at 220 ("undocumented
status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal").
69. Not long ago, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent dissimilarity between citizens and aliens when it adopted "a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization." Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). The Court made it abundantly clear that "a host of constitutional
and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens
and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other. ...
Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident
diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a
share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and
some of its guests. The decision to share that bounty with our guests may take into account
the character of the relationship between the alien and this country .. " Id at 80. However uncharitable such selective generosity in dispensing benefits between citizens and aliens
may appear, it is not constitutionally impermissible. The courts have approved and the Constitution sanctions the right of the state to determine the object of its benevolence.
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legal characteristic over which children can have little control."7 0 Accordingly, the majority concluded that there was no apparent "rational
justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the
United States."' I While conceding that cogent arguments support "the
view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very
presence within the United States is the product of their own unlawful
conduct," 7 2 the majority distinguished illegal alien children who cannot
directly control their illegal status. Relying exclusively on illegitimacy
cases, the Court reasoned that "visiting. . . condemnation on the head
of an [illegal alien child] is illogical and unjust [because] imposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual respon73
sibility or wrongdoing.
Contrary to the majority's assertions, however, the Texas statute is
neither irrational nor unjustifiable simply because the onus falls more
directly on "innocent" 74 children. As the dissent pointed out, a legislature may consider "relevant differences between the mentally healthy
75
and the mentally ill, or between the residents of different counties,"
even though individual choice or culpability is absent. For example,
lawfully resident children are unable to control the school district in
which their parents reside. Yet the Court in San Antonio failed to apply heightened scrutiny to a law affecting such innocent children, even
though the burden of disparate educational opportunity was entirely
borne by them.7 6
More important, it is not nearly so "difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence
within the United States" 77 as the majority declares. Obviously, it is
unreasonable to argue that the availability of free public education will
have no influence on either the individual or the familial immigration
70. Poler,457 U.S. at 220.
71. Id

72. Id at 219.
73. Id at 220 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote omitted)).
74. The common dictionary meaning of "innocence" is "free from legal guilt." THE
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 368 (1974). Thus, the majority confuses the term innocence with fairness. Congress was unpersuaded by concerns of fairness when it enacted
legislation that gave the alien children in Plyler an illegal status and authorized the Immigration and Naturalization Service to deport such children upon apprehension. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1982). Illegal alien children are sympathetic violators of federal immigration law,
but such deserved compassion does not alter their illegal status.
75. Ply/er, 457 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id at 245 n.5.
77. Ply/er, 457 U.S. at 220.
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decision and consequently no impact whatsoever on illegal alien immigration in general. 78 The immigration decision is not made in a vacuum. All but the most cruel parents consider the welfare of their
children in making such an important family decision.7 9 Once the state
removes the attraction of free education, the decisionmaking scales are
immediately rebalanced against the possible decision to immigrate. To
complete the syllogism, denying illegal aliens free public education
would have some negative impact-albeit unquantifiable-on illegal
immigration."0
In sum, the insufficient "suspectness" of illegal aliens as a class, the
finding that education is not a fundamental right, the educational nature of the statute and the reasonable justification for state denial of
free education to illegal alien children notwithstanding their legal "indeferential standard of minimum scrunocence" dictate that the more
8
tiny was proper in Pller. '
B.

The Texas Statute Satisfies the Rational Basis Test

L

Defning the RationalBasis Standard

The minimum level of scrutiny in the rational basis standard of
review is "limited to whether the legislative classification at issue bears
a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."8 2 This rational
78. It is axiomatic that "[alt the individual level, private benefits are assumed to exceed
costs if the individual decides to accept employment abroad . . . . [T]he individual is assumed to weigh the advantages accruing from opportunities abroad" when making the often
difficult immigration decision. Martin & Houstoun, supra note 3 1, at 39.
79. The following personalized story of one illegal alien's plight reveals that the availability of a free and superior education in the United States is a significant factor in the
decision to immigrate: "Currently a bad back has left him jobless. As an illegal alien, he is
afraid to apply for unemployment and other benefits. He is in debt, owing $558 to the
County Hospital, $800 to a god-daughter and $300 to a friendly grocer. . . . But despite
his troubles, he wants to stay. There is opportunity here that is lacking in Mexico, he says,
and his children are getting a good education." Corwin, 4 Human Rights Dilemma.- Carter
and "Undocumented" Mexicans, in IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS 329 (A. Corwin ed.

1978) (quoting Lancaster, Rising Tide PoorMexicans FloodInto U.S. to Seek Jobs,Deluging
BorderPatrol, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1977, at 21, col. 1)(emphasis added).
80. See Comment, Does the Constitution Guaranteea Free Public Education to Undocumented Alien Children supra note 21, at 654 (the grant of benefits including education to
illegal aliens encourages them to immigrate in violation of federal immigration law); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Equal Protectionand Educating Illegal Alien Children, 11 SETON
HALL L. REV. 499, 517-18 (1980) (conceding that a free public education is some inducement
to immigrate).
81. Plyler,457 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Perry, supranote 63, at 334-35. But
see Lichtenberg, supra note 21, at 369-70.
82. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 248.
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basis test is extremely deferential to the legislature.8 3 All it requires is
that some reasonable basis for the classification exist; mathematical
precision is not necessary. 84 Because of the substantial deference accorded by the rational basis test "[a] statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it."8 5 Once even the "slightest justification" is found for the distinction
the judicial inquiry is at an end. 6 A legislative finding of fact will be
struck down by the Court only if "it may be characterized as 'arbitrary,'
'irrational,' or 'unreasonable.' "87 Therefore, under the rational basis
standard there is a strong presumption that any statute is constitutional.
2

Applying Minimum Scrutiny to Plyler

The purported objectives of the Texas statute were to (1) prevent
undue depletion of limited funds available for education and other social services; (2) preserve the fiscal integrity of the state's school financing system in the face of an ever increasing cost burden caused by
illegal alien immigration; (3) quell the rapid influx of illegal aliens by
removing free public education as an incentive to immigrate; and (4)
enhance the quality of public education in Texas.88 In his dissent,
Chief Justice Burger asserted that the fiscal concerns alone justified the
Texas objectives.8 9 In light of the judicially recognized importance of
local control over public education, 90 the other state interests were
manifestly legitimate. 9 1
With the first half of the rational basis test satisfied, the next question is whether the Texas statute is a rational and reasonable means of
furthering these legitimate state objectives. The means utilized to
83. Such a deferential standard of review involves minimum scrutiny in theory and
practically none in fact. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward"In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972). See also Kane & Velarde-Mufioz, supra note 21, at 484. See generally P.
BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING CASES AND

MATERIALS 569-76 (1983).

84. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).

85. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Metropolitan Ins. & Gas. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S.
580, 584 (1935).
86. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 225-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also
Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 567 (1931); P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, supranote 83, at 556.
87. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 248 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting in part). See also Communist Party v. Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 94-95 (1961).
88. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228-30.
89. Id at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
90. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
91. Id.
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achieve the legislative goal may take reform "one step at a time," 92 and
minimum scrutiny does not require "that all evils of the same genus be
eradicated or none at all."93 The state need not choose the most effective and all-encompassing means of addressing a problem.9 4 This deferential standard of review will even tolerate a law that is not entirely
consistent with its aims.9 5 Thus, the Texas Legislature legitimately may
deny illegal aliens free public education without also denying them
other state benefits enjoyed by citizens and legally resident aliens.
The first step in such legislative reform may be the denial of free
public education to illegal aliens. Under minimum scrutiny the Court
cannot require that another "first step" be taken in place of the legislature's initial decision as long as the standard is otherwise satisfied.
Consequently, it is irrelevant that a state law precluding illegal alien
employment may have greater efficacy in reducing illegal immigration
under minimum scrutiny review. The courts cannot substitute their
own views or choices for those of the legislature regarding the most
appropriate remedial measure among the myriad of alternatives.
Admittedly, it may be impossible to measure precisely the effect
that the Texas statute had on net illegal immigration across its borders.
But the unavailability of free public education logically had some negative effect on the immigration decision.9 6 It is also axiomatic that
charging tuition for illegal alien children who were previously provided
this expensive service free of charge obviously will augment the avail92. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 389 (1955).
93. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Central Lumber Co. v. South
Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 160 (1912).
94. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1911)). The court in Dandridgecontinued, "We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives. ...
[T]he Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with
the difficult responsibility of allocating limited . . . funds among the myriad of potential
recipients." 397 U. S. at 487 (citations omitted).
95. In giving meaning to minimum scrutiny, Justice Rehnquist has reaffirmed that
"'[t]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.
It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.'" Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 466 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 487-88 (1955)).
96. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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able educational funds. 97 It is thus conceivable that denying illegal
alien children the right to free public education may have a salutary
effect on the overall quality of public education in Texas. 98 Although
the relationship may be indirect and somewhat tenuous, it nevertheless
exists. The Texas statute satisfies the rational basis test insofar as it is
plainly not irrational for a state to conclude that denial of free education to illegal aliens will further legitimate state financial, demographic,
and educational objectives.99
97. In the absence of illegal alien children, the Texas school system could achieve substantial cost savings by terminating costly special education programs such as bilingual
classes. See Note, Plyler v. Doe: EqualProtection/orIllegal Aliens, supra note 56, at 144.
98. Although some have argued that the quality of education varies directly with the
amount of money spent on it, this relationship has been consistently demonstrated only for
basic expenditures regarding facilities, books, and the number of teachers. But even these
expenditures eventually reach a saturation point at which diminishing returns in educational
quality are encountered. Attempts to correlate higher teacher salaries with an increase in
the quality of education have been inconclusive. See, e.g., San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 43 n.86,
46 n.101. The risk in reading the minds of the Texas Legislature is that they may have
intended to spend the extra funds available on better facilities, better equipment such as
computer terminals, more books, more teachers, more administrators, expanded areas of
study, and improved testing or any number of other possible improvements in education
"quality."
Therefore, it is impossible to say where these funds might go and if they would ultimately improve overall educational quality. Moreover, the history of legislative appropriation, whether state or federal, reveals that statutory efficacy is seldom a prerequisite to
expenditure by the state. Few appropriations would ever be made if the legislature were
forced to demonstrate a threshold of effectiveness for a proposed bill before it could become
law. It should be sufficient that the law might have its desired effect. The Texas statute was
such a law.
99. Pyler, 457 U.S. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Perry, supra note 63, at 338 (the
Texas statute "would have survived review under any fair application of the traditional
standard"). See also Note, Undocumented Aliens-EqualProtectionand the Right to a Free
Public Education.- Doe v. Plyler, 33 ALA. L. REv. 181 (1981) (a rational relation test should
have been adopted). Presently, the Texas Legislature is considering a bill to allow local
school districts to require year-round school in order to alleviate the tremendous overcrowding and underbudgeting in many Texas schools. Dallas Morning News, Apr. 3, 1983, at IA,
col. 1. Texas in 1981 ranked 42nd in expenditure per child for education compared to other
states. Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: EqualProtectionandEducatingIllegalAlien Children,
supra note 80, at 518. The Houston Independent School District could face an estimated $46
million budget deficit in 1984. Dallas Morning News, Apr. 3, 1983, at IA, col. 1. In addition, "[tiaxpayers are in no mood to fork over more money to cover both future deficits and
the construction of more schools." Id With this in mind, it is apparent that the decision of
the Texas Legislature to deny illegal alien children a free public education was impelled in
large part by an actual educational financing crisis. The Texas Legislature thus had the
legitimate state interests of financial conservation and educational quality firmly in mind
when it acted.
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C. The Texas Statute Is Valid Even Under Intermediate Scrutiny
1. Defining IntermediateScrutiny

The intermediate scrutiny standard ofjudicial review requires that
the classification "serve important governmental objectives and. . . be
substantially related to achievement of these objectives.'
Unlike
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny does not require the statute to
serve a compelling state interest,' 0' nor must it be precisely drawn to
02
further that state interest.1
2. The Texas Statute Serves an Important Governmental Objective
The members of the class to which the Texas statute applies have
been given an illegal status by Congress. 0 3 Their entrance into and
continued presence in the United States is illegal."° Yet a quiescent
Congress has failed to provide an adequate enforcement mechanism to
effectuate federal immigration law. 05 Current estimates of the total
number of illegal aliens in the United States range between six and ten
million. 10 6 The number of deportable aliens in the United States in100. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). See generalo G. GUNTHER,
supra note 21, at 864-79.
101. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) (acknowledging that there is "something in
between" the compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) and the rational basis test (minimum scrutiny)).
102. Only strict scrutiny requires that the statute be precisely tailored to further the purported state interest. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964). Intermediate scrutiny is a less exacting standard that merely requires a
substantial relation between the statute and the "important" state interests. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
103. Ply/er, 457 U.S. at 205.
104. Alonso v. State, 50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 253-54, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1975) (citation
omitted).
105. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is underbudgeted and understaffed. As a result, the current border patrol cannot prevent or even appreciably reduce
illegal immigration. Abrams, supra note 57, at 125; Smith, Introduction: U.S. Immigration
Policy,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1982, at 1,6-7. See also Martin & Houstoun, supra
note 31, at 49.
106. Immigration: Getting Their Slice ofParadise,TIME, May 2, 1977, at 26; Harrigan,
Immigration LawK-Congress Has Chancefor Reappraisal,Durham Morning Herald, Mar.
21, 1982, at 5A,col. 1. Some estimates of the number of illegal aliens have ranged as high as
12,000,000. Chapman, 4 Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United
States, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 34, 35 (1975). For a comprehensive statistical examination of
the number of illegal aliens entering the United States during the past decade, see Corwin,
supra note 38 passim.
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creased twenty fold from 1967 to 1978.107 Since the decision in Ply/er,
the economic crisis in Mexico has caused illegal alien immigration to
increase by 20% to 50%. 108 The U.S. Border Patrol has reported that
some communities in Texas have experienced a 70% increase in net

illegal alien immigration.

09

During 1983 more than one million illegal

aliens were arrested along the United States-Mexico border," l0 a one
year record for illegal alien arrests."'
Coupled with this illegal immigration are substantial socioeconomic costs primarily borne by the states." 2 Reliable data indicate

that the cost of educating illegal aliens for the County of San Diego
alone is between $10,900,000 and $21,000,000, or 1.9% to 3.7% of total
school budgetary costs. 113 Aside from the direct costs incurred, there

are additional costs encountered in the proper planning and operation
of the schools because the potential number of illegal alien children
seeking to attend Texas schools is extremely difficult to predict. More
specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized that an uncertain increase in student enrollment causes "'overcrowded classrooms and related facilities; over-large teacher-pupil ratios; expansion of bilingual

programs; the purchase of books, equipment, supplies and other customary items of support; all of which. . . require a substantial increase
in the budget of the school districts.' "I"
107. Note, To Educate or Not to Educate: The Plight of Undocumented Alien Children in
Texas, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 119, 119 n.1 (1982) (quoting United States Interagency Task Force
on Immigration Policy, Staff Report, Depts. of Justice, Labor and State 30 (1979)).
108. Dallas Morning News, Feb. 26, 1983, at 28A, col. 2. Recent U.S. Border Patrol
statistics reveal the gravity of the situation as a record 108,000 aliens were arrested while
attempting to cross the U.S. border illegally in March 1983. Durham Morning Herald, Apr.
9, 1983, at 3A, col. 1. This was a 43% increase over the number apprehended in March 1982.
Id
109. Dallas Morning News, Feb. 27, 1983, at 28A, col. 2.
110. Durham Morning Herald, Jan. 9, 1984, at 7B, col. 1.
111. Id.
112. See Fogel, supra note 36, at 73 (concluding that "illegal aliens do have significant
negative impacts on the United States"); Harrigan, supra note 106 (noting that illegal alien
immigration has adverse cultural and linguistic effects in addition to the socioeconomic costs
created by such immigration); Hofstetter, Economic Underdevelopment and the Population
Explosion: Implicationsfor U.S. Immigration Pollicy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1982, at 55, 65; Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien: 4 Legal, Social, and
EconomicAnalysis, 13 Hous. L. REV. 863, 864 (1976); Note, Wetbacks: Can the States Act to
Curb Illegal Entry 6 STAN. L. REV. 287, 288-95 (1954) (drastic social and economic consequences result from illegal alien immigration). But see Corwin & Fogel, Shadow Labor
Force: Mexican Workers in the American Economy, in IMMIGRANTS-AND IMMIGRANTS,
285-95 (A. Corwin ed. 1978).
113. Corwin, supra note 38, at 258.
114. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 329 n.9 (1983) (quoting Arredondo v. Brockette,
482 F. Supp. 212, 215 (S.D. Tex. 1979)). In holding that a Texas law denying tuition-free
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Thirty years ago, one commentator observed that the problem of
illegal alien immigration is "one which is within the power of the Federal Government to meet, and which the Federal Government is best
able to meet. Yet political pressures have been sufficient to forestall any
forceful legislative attack on the situation." ' 5 Why has Congress
failed to act? The action or inaction of Congress regarding an urgent

issue is often colored by the politics of expediency. Congress represents
all fifty states. Illegal alien immigration is, however, primarily the
problem of a few southwestern states among which Texas is prominently included." 6 A member of Congress from a northern state has
little incentive to support increased federal spending to prevent illegal
immigration or alleviate its impact." 7 Thus, if the affected states
are
foreclosed from taking legislative action that, while respecting constitu-

tional rights, makes residency for potential illegal aliens far less attractive, the states will be forced to accept the enormous social and
economic consequences of the status quo." 81 Even if the denial of free
education does not substantially reduce illegal alien immigration, states
admission to its public schools for nonresidents was constitutionally valid, the Court accepted the District Court's findings regarding the consequences of permitting nonresident
children to attend Texas schools free of charge. Id
Beyond education expenditure at the state level, illegal aliens annually cost the federal
government $6,900,000 for public education in New York alone. Salinas & Torres, supra
note 112, at 880 (citation omitted).
By failing to extend federal welfare programs to illegal aliens, Congress has implicitly
recognized the substantial costs placed on governmental benefits by illegal aliens. See, e.g.,
7 U.S.C. § 2015(f) (1982) (excluding illegal aliens from food stamp programs); 42 U.S.C.
§1381(a)(1)(B) (1976) (excluding illegal aliens from supplemental security income to the
aged, blind, and disabled); 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1982) (excluding illegal aliens from aid to
families with dependent children); 42 C.F.R. § 405.205(b) (1982) (excluding illegal aliens
from Medicaid). As recently as March 31, 1983, the United States Senate refused to table an
amendment denying Social Security benefits to illegal aliens who have worked in the United
States. Durham Morning Herald, Apr. 1, 1983, at 6A, col. 2. The roll was 34 in favor of the
amendment and 58 against it. Id
115. Note, supranote 112, at 288 (citations omitted).
116. Hull, Undocumented.4liensand the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 21, at 49;
Seller, supra note 36, at 157. Between 675,000 and 1,000,000 illegal aliens are estimated to
presently reside in Texas. Casenote, Plyler v. Doe: The Rights of Undocumented Childrento
a Free Public School Edcuation, 5 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 355, 356 (1982) (citation
omitted).
117. See Seller, supra note 36, at 159 (any deleterious labor effects of illegal aliens are
confined to the southwest). For example, auto workers in Detroit will be unlikely to protest
illegal alien immigration because they are not affected by it. Id
118. Illegal aliens have an adverse impact on American labor because (1) they take jobs
normally filled by unskilled Americans; (2) they decrease wages and impair the working
conditions of Americans; and (3) they reduce the effectiveness of employee organizations.
H.R. REP. No. 108, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) (cited in Kane & Velarde-Mufiloz, supra
note 21, at 461-62). See Fogel, supra note 36, at 66. But see Corwin & Fogel, supra note
112.
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should be able to say to Congress, absent either a fundamental right or
a suspect class, that "we cannot afford and will no longer pay for your
legislative inaction." The states should not be forced to rely on Congress, which has not taken serious remedial action in the past, and
which appears unlikely to act in the foreseeable future.' 19
3. The Texas Statute Is Substantially Related to the Achievement of Its
PurportedObjectives
The majority in Plyler concluded that the Texas statute was not
substantially related to the achievement of its purposes because the
statute represented "'a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide
of illegal immigration' "120 when compared to the prohibition of illegal
alien employment. 2 ' In making this hasty judicial assertion the Court
assumed too much.
First, the Court incorrectly presumed that intermediate scrutiny
requires a state to choose the single most effective means of regulating
public education to survive constitutional attack.22 Under strict scrutiny, the state must adopt the necessary or most effective means of regulation for the statute to survive equal protection review. 123 Strict

scrutiny demands that the means must be precisely drawn to achieve
the state objective.' 24 Conversely, the greater leniency of intermediate
scrutiny does not require that the statutory means be necessary nor pre119. See Note, supra note 112, at 288.
120. Plyler,457 U.S. 228, 230 (1982) (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D.
Tex. 1978)).
121. 457 U.S. at 228-29.

122. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. The legislative "reform may take one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy
there, neglecting others." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Nor is a
method of regulation chosen by the legislature unconstitutional simply because a state
"might have furthered its underlying purpose more artfully, more directly, or more completely. . .

." Hughes

v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813 (1976). See generally

Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); G. GUNTHER, supra note 21, at 686.
123. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
194 (1964). Some commentators even argue that strict scrutiny should require a showing that
"the classification fits [the] goal with virtual perfection." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUST 146 (1980).

124. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1,7 (1977) (quoting Examining Bd. v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976)); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (citations
omitted). Although mere administrative convenience is not sufficient justification under intermediate scrutiny, it is nevertheless a factor properly to be considered by the courts. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (plurality opinion); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76-77 (1971).

Summer 1984]

ILLEGAL ALIENS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

cisely tailored to achieve the state objective. 12 5 Intermediate scrutiny,
as its title suggests, is an admittedly less exacting standard of review. It
demands that there be a substantial relationship between the means
and the stated objective, rather than implicit assumption that the means
be necessary. In describing the limits of judicial inquiry in the area of

public education, the Supreme Court has remarked: "The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public
school system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitution-

ally permissible method of solving them,' and that, within the limits of
rationality, 'the legislature's efforts to tackel the problems' should be
entitled to respect."' 126 Hence, the Texas statute is not constitutionally
fatal merely because the absolute prohibition of illegal alien employ-

ment might have a more telling effect on illegal immigration than
would the denial of free public education.

Second, the Court mistakenly presumed that prohibiting illegal
alien employment would reduce illegal immigration more effectively,
compared to the denial of free education. 127 It is a dubious proposition

that individuals who have already broken federal law in search of employment will suddenly become law-conscious "illegal residents" and
respect the commands of state law that prohibit their employment. 128
125. In the seminal case establishing intermediate review for classifications based on gender, the Supreme Court held in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), that an Oklahoma law
permitting young women to drink alcohol between the ages of 18 and 20, but denying males
the same age this privilege in the name of traffic safety, was not sustainable under intermediate scrutiny. Id at 197-99. The Court also noted that a correlation of two percent was "an
unduly tenuous 'fit"' between sex and driving while intoxicated. Id at 202 (citation omitted). Unlike the males in Craig,however, illegal aliens are not similarly situated with respect to legal resident aliens and U.S. citizens. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying
text.
126. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 42 (quoting in part Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,
546-47 (1972)).
127. Without any demonstrable evidence, the Court expressly assumes in Pliyer that employer sanctions are a far superior legislative choice when compared to the denial of free
education to illegal aliens. There is no basis in experience for this assumption. Employer
sanctions are wholly ineffective because they are effectively unenforceable. Castillo, Remarks on ImmigrationPolicy. 4 Time to Think Small, 44 U. PiTT. L. REv. 485, 486 (1983).
Moreover, the Court overlooked the possibility that the effect of employer sanctions "will be
to drive undocumented workers further underground where they will be subject to more
exploitation than they are now." Huerta, Immigration Policyand EmployerSanctions, 44 U.
PIr. L. REV. 507, 511 (1983). Likewise, the Court did not consider that "a radical proposal
like employer sanctions will have a dramatic ripple effect throughout the economy." Id at
513. It is thus unclear whether employer sanctions are any less "ludicrously ineffectual" as a
means of thwarting illegal alien immigration when contrasted with the denial of free education. In addition to this question of efficacy, employer sanctions may well have significant
adverse impacts on illegal aliens and the U.S. economy, as noted above.
128. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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The immediate reply simply is that as long as illegal alien employers
are the object of enforcement and punished accordingly, the law will be
obeyed. If such employers strictly adhere to the law, potential illegal
aliens eventually will recognize the futility of immigration to the extent
that they cannot "legally" work in Texas. Yet only an equally undeserved faith in the law abiding nature of illegal alien employers permits
such a conclusion. 2 9 In fact, employers in Texas have been notorious
for their exploitation of cheap illegal alien labor.'3 ° It is well documented that these employers routinely violate farm labor and other employment laws.13
Equally important, the underlying problem with the tremendous
unchecked influx of illegal aliens into Texas is enforcement. Against
unprecedented numbers of illegal aliens seeking to enter the United
States surreptitiously, the present INS patrols are grossly insufficient to
enforce the congressional mandate of selective admittance. 32 The enforcement of immigration law becomes a hopeless endeavor once illegal aliens are inside the border because (1) the absolute numbers are
too great and (2) the natural incentives for such aliens to immigrate
and for United States farmers or service firms to employ them are so
overwhelming that skillful evasion naturally occurs.' 33 The uniform
129. The exploitation of illegal alien workers is most severe in the southwest. Waldinger,
supra note 38, at 210.
130. Studies of illegal alien workers in Texas found that their average hourly earnings
were below the legal minimum wage. Waldinger, supra note 38, at 210. See also Kane &
Velarde-Mufioz, supra note 21, at 468.
131. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976), and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976), apply with equal force to all workers regardless of
their illegal status. Various studies have established that "[i]nfractions of the labor codes
now appear to occur on a fairly wide scale among light manufacturing, service, and construction firms employing undocumented immigrants. A survey of 826 illegal restaurant and
garment workers in Los Angeles found that wage underpayments affect 30% to 40% of the
workforce. . . . Other data derived from the investigations of federal and state labor standards agencies also point to extensive minimum wage, overtime, and child labor violations
in industries employing large numbers of undocumented workers." Waldinger, supra note
38, at 210 (citations omitted). Despite the frequency of violations and the potential protection afforded by labor laws, "few illegals, whether they are aware of their rights or are victims of systems they do not understand, complain when their employers break wage and
working condition laws." Martin & Houstoun, supra note 31, at 48. The failure to report
labor law infractions is equally prevalent among less ignorant illegals because "[iunformed
aliens may be just as docile as their less knowledgeable brethren because many fear that a
complaint will encourage their employers to turn them in to the INS [and]. . . if the complaint leads to apprehension, the alien worker loses wages, will probably have to pay another $300 to $400 smuggling fee to get back into the United States, and may have to find
another U.S. job." Id See also Fogel, supra note 36, at 66.
132. See supra note 105.
133. In a study of 20 foreign countries where similar employer sanctions were adopted,
employees were usually able to evade responsibility, and the penalties actually applied in
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experience of those states that have enacted statutes prohibiting illegal
alien employment has been one of disappointment and disillusionment:
"[a]l reliable evidence points to the conclusion that employer sanctions
will not be enforced. . . . Only one $250 fine has been levied in the
combined experience of all states with employer sanctions legislation." 1 34 The ever increasing abundance of illegal alien labor and its
low cost continue to prevent effective enforcement of employer
sanctions.
Not to be overlooked, state administration of a statute denying illegal aliens free public education is arguably less costly than administering a state law prohibiting illegal alien employment. It is in the
pecuniary interests of local school districts to comply with such legislation inasmuch as they will have less revenue available per student enrolled if they continue to provide illegal aliens with free public
education. In addition, enforcement is less difficult because public education is a government provided benefit, whereas illegal alien employment generally is obtained from the private sector. Even if punishment
were severe, the economic incentives provided by illegal alien employment would likely override the risk of legal liability. 35 The incentive
to avoid prosecution would make enforcement of state sanctions
against illegal alien employers a Herculean administrative and enforcement task.
Free education is at least some inducement to immigrate illegally.
Denying free education to illegal aliens would make Texas marginally
less attractive to potential immigrants. It is unclear, however, whether
sanctions against employers have any negative impact on illegal immigration.' 36 Consequently, the majority in Plyler ruled improvidently
when it assumed that employer sanctions would be vastly more effecthose cases which were prosecuted successfully were too insignificant to deter the hiring of
illegal aliens. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at A20, col. 1. The study cited strict legal restraints
on investigations, the lack of trained personnel, and noncommunication between government agencies as reasons for the lack of enforcement; all are amply present in the United
States. Id
134. Huerta, supra note 127, at 508. See also Castillo, supra note 127, at 486.
135. Although California has very strict employer sanctions for hiring illegal aliens, it
had the greatest number of illegal alien arrests in 1983. Durham Morning Herald, Jan. 9,
1984, at 7B, col. 1.Over 500,000 arests of illegal aliens were made in the San Diego area
alone last year, which is more than half of all such arrests made in the United States during
1983. Id
136. Laws prohibiting illegal alien employment are inherently unenforceable. See supra
text accompanying notes 127-34. Much like the many anachronistic laws still contained in
numerous state codes but which are no longer enforced, laws prohibiting illegal alien employment have no practical effect on individual behavior. Employers are not influenced by
the threat of sanctions for employing illegal alien labor. Similarly, for example, individuals
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tive in curtailing illegal immigration than the Texas statute under review. In brief, the relative efficacy of the Texas statute and its
administrative superiority establish that the statute did substantially relate to the achievement of purported state objectives.
It is significant that "[eiqual protection does not free those who
made a bad assessment of the risks or a bad choice from the consequences of their decision."' 3 7 Equal protection alone does not protect
illegal aliens from the imprudence of their decision to immigrate; either
a fundamental right or a suspect class is required. The Court's lack of
expertise with regard to the causes and consequences of illegal alien
immigration possibly led it to overlook or simply ignore considerations
that the Texas Legislature may have deemed dispositive. The Court
also failed to recognize that intermediate scrutiny permits some deterrence. From the foregoing, it appears that the Texas statute was substantially related to the achievement of important state objectives. It
therefore satisfied even the more exacting equal protection standard of
intermediate scrutiny.
II.

Congressional Authorization of State Denial of Free
Public Education to Illegal Aliens

However unpersuasive the reasoning and unsound the conclusions
38
in Ply/er v. Doe, the Supreme Court has finally spoken on the matter.1
It is unlikely that the Court will soon overrule itself. This section accepts the constitutional validity and precedential value of P ler and
addresses the salient question which remains: 3 9 Would a state law denying illegal alien children the right to free public education survive
constitutional attack if such a statute were authorized expressly by
neither refrain from fornication in states where it is still illegal, nor consider the existence of
such laws-which are almost never enforced-when deciding whether to reside in a state.
137. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 226 (1978).
138. On the notion of finality, one Supreme Court Justice has remarked: "We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). It is clear, therefore, that although
the reasoning of the majority is not infallible, the decision is final.
139. "[In the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that supports the state in denying these children
an elementary education." Pl yer, 457 U.S. at 226.
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Congress? 140
A.

Congress Has Exclusive Power over the Admission and Deportation
of Aliens

The Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority "[t]o establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization."'' n4 Congress thus has exclusive
authority to regulate the entry and deportation of aliens within the
United States. 142 An excluded alien has no right of entry, and "as a
fundamental act of sovereignty [the exclusion] is not subject to review."' 143 Congress may exclude any class of aliens from entry, 44 and
140. A congressional act authorizing the states to deny illegal aliens the right to a free
public education might include the following legislative findings and declaration of policy:
A. Findings
(1) The unprecedented influx of illegal aliens from Mexico into our southwestern states
presents a grave social and economic crisis to those states.
(2) In the foreseeable future the United States will remain economically attractive to
many Mexicans, and thus the rate of illegal immigration into the United States will remain
intolerably high.
(3) Due to the inherent difficulty and the lack of uniformity in the nature of the particular problems presented to each state as a direct result of illegal alien immigration, the
individual state governments are better prepared and should be encouraged to enact corrective legislation.
(4) The immense number of illegal aliens residing in our southwestern states drains the
financial resources of such states and produces a general decline in the quality of governmental benefits provided, especially public education.
(5) The ever increasing socioeconomic costs of the unacceptably high rate of illegal
immigration are primarily borne by the citizens and legal residents of our southwestern
states.
(6) Substantial federal and state income tax revenues are annually lost due to the low
incidence of income tax payment among illegal aliens and the impossibility of collection.
(7) Under present revenue transfer schemes, the federal government pays a substantial
portion of each illegal alien's free public education now provided by the states.
(8) The encouragement to immigrate illegally provided by state provision of free public
education for illegal aliens is not consistent with present federal immigration law, which
excludes such aliens from the United States and requires their deportation upon apprehension anywhere within the United States.
B. Declarationof Policy
(1) In light of the foregoing findings, Congress authorizes the states of this Nation to
deny the right to a free public education to "illegal aliens" as that term is so defined by our
present immigration laws.
(2) Although Congress authorizes and encourages the states, consistent with federal
immigration law, to deny illegal aliens a free public education, the states are not required to
do so.
141. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
142. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 766-67 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,419 (1948); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538,
547 (1894); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
143. Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, 193 F. Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. I11.1960). See Shaughnessy v.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953).
144. Licea-Gomez, 193 F. Supp. at 580.
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"[n]o State may independently exercise a like power."' 4 5 Due to the
exclusivity and supremacy of federal power over immigration, judicial
review of Congressional legislation regarding illegal aliens is of a funthan review of state and local laws afdamentally different character
46
fecting illegal aliens. 1
B. Congress Is Given Greater Deference than the State Legislatures
over the Regulation of Illegal Aliens
1. FederalImmigration Laws Require Less JudicialScrutiny
The majority in Plyler conceded in dictum that "undocumented
status, coupled with some articulable federal policy, might enhance
state authority with respect to the treatment of undocumented
aliens."14 7 The Court recognized the possibility that state regulation of
illegal aliens, buttressed by express congressional authorization, might
be entitled to a more deferential standard of review.' 4 8 The scope of
equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is not
completely coextensive with respect to aliens. 149 Equal Protection limitations on state action appear substantially greater than those imposed
145. PIer,457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
146. See Perry, supra note 63, at 334-35; Note, Plyler v. Doe: Equal ProtectionforIllegal
Aliens, supra note 56, at 154; Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens, supra note 56, at 1089;
Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens: In Search of a Consistent Theory, 16
Hous. L. REv. 667, 703 (1979); Casenote, supranote 116, at 380-82; Recent Developments, 28
VILL. L. REv. 198, 209 (1982).
147. lyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
148. Notwithstanding this assertion by the Court, it is well established that "Congress
may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause." Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 641 (1968). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
However, the Court implicitly recognizes here that congressional authorization of state regulation regarding illegal aliens would not be constitutionally infirm under equal protection
attack. Hence, Congress would not be authorizing the states to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. This is true because congressional authorization of state regulation concerning illegal aliens merely entitles the states to greater deference from the Court when reviewing such
state legislation. As a result, state statutes withholding governmental benefits may survive
equal protection review with congressional authorization, whereas in the absence of such
congressional approval these state statutes might-as in PtIler-be struck down on equal
protection grounds.
149. The Supreme Court has declared that "it is not 'political hypocrisy' to recognize that
the Fourteenth Amendment's limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization."
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86-87 (1976); accord Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 100 (1976). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has remarked that "Congress clearly has the
power to draw distinctions between classes of aliens which, if drawn among classes of citizens, would appear to violate the equal protection clause or other constitutional rights."
Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1290 (5th Cir. 1977). The states could not draw such
distinctions without also violating the Constitution.
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upon federal power over immigration and naturalization. 50 Recent
history reveals that "[w]hile subjecting most state regulation to strict
scrutiny, the Court has only lightly reviewed federal restrictions
....
,,15 1 For example, the Supreme Court has held that overriding
national interests may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service even
though an identical requirement may
52
not be enforced by a state.'
These overriding national interests in the context of illegal aliens
might include (1) encouraging naturalization; (2) discouraging further
immigration to ameliorate the adverse socioeconomic consequences
that accompany uncontrolled illegal immigration; (3) giving the states
greater authority to cope with the illegal alien crisis; and (4) providing
the President with an expendable token for treaty negotiations.' 5 3
When the federal government asserts an overriding national interest as
justification for a rule creating a classification based on alienage, the
limit of judicial inquiry is whether there is a legitimate basis for
54
presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest.
Not surprisingly, whenever the rule is expressly mandated by Congress,
the presumption is raised "that any interest which might rationally be
served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption.'1 55 To the extent
that Congress is given greater deference in formulating immigration
policy, federally authorized "discrimination" against illegal aliens may
be permissible even though state legislatures might not have been able
15 6
to act similarly on their own.
2

Sefparation of Powers and the Quasi-PoliticalQuestion Doctrine

The Constitution's express textual commitment of control over
aliens to Congress 57 gives rise to important political question concerns
150. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86-87.
151. Note, The Equal Treatment ofAliens, supra note 56, at 1089; see also 28 VILL. L.
REv. 198, 209 (1982).
152. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100.
153. These overriding federal interests are expressly included in the hypothetical congressional statute authorizing the states to deny a free public education to illegal aliens. See
supra note 140.
154. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 103.
155. Id. The essentials of the fictional congressional statute contained in note 140 represent such an express mandate.
156. With respect to classifying aliens, Congress is entitled to greater deference than the
states because "a division by a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that
State into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification,
whereas, a comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally
legitimate part of business." Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85.
157. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.

628

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[VoL 11:599

whenever the judiciary endeavors to review congressional legislation in
this area.1 58 Recognizing the political nature of immigration policy,
one commentator has accurately observed that
[t]he formulation of. . .immigration policy . . . is an intricate
task requiring the delicate balancing of a wide range of foreign
and domestic policies. United States trade policy, national security and energy policies, relations with developing countries, the
domestic economy, and the civil rights of American citizens are
all inextricably linked to U.S. immigration policy. Likewise, the
economic and demographic phenomena which must be considformulation of immigration policy are varied and
ered in the
59
complex.'
There can be no doubt that questions regarding illegal aliens are "truly
political questions." 16 The policies underlying the political question
doctrine dictate that when judicial review of legislation is necessary, it
only with great deference to congressional
should be undertaken
61
judgment.'
62
The general political question test formulated in Baker v. Carr"
includes the following criteria:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing the lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
158. "Where the Constitution assigns a particular function wholly and indivisibly to another department, the federal judiciary does not intervene." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
246 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). With respect to aliens, see Bickel,
The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword" The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 76
(1961); Scharpf, JudicialReview and the PoliticalQuestion. A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517, 578-80 n.218 (1966). See generally The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 62, 135-40 (1982).

159. Huerta, supra note 127, at 514.
160. Abrams, supra note 57, at 131.
161. When the political question issue is raised, the Court's initial inquiry is limited to
whether sufficient political question concerns exist which would render the case nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
When political question concerns are not sufficient to make the case nonjusticiable, the separation of powers doctrine requires considerable deference to the legislative and executive
branches so that the Court does not encroach upon nonjudicial functions. See G. GUNTHER,
supra note 21, at 424-56.
162. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

Summer 1984]

ILLEGAL ALIENS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

629

of embarassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various
163
departments on one question.
Greater deference due a federal statute authorizing states to deny illegal aliens free education could be based on the textually demonstrable
commitment of national immigration policy to Congress.' 64 Additional
political question concerns are raised because the Court cannot decide
the illegal aliens issue without an initial socioeconomic policy determination that it cannot competently make. 65 Due to the extremely controversial nature of the issue,' 66 the statute arguably demands an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made by Congress. Also, the clear command of the statute might
give the President an important bargaining chip in treaty negotiations
with Mexico. Thus, if the Supreme Court struck down the statute, the
President could be embarrassed in his negotiations with Mexico. The
President's prestige and ability to conduct foreign policy would be significantly harmed.
In the unique context of immigration, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the inherent political character of immigration patently counsels against judicial intervention:
It is pertinent to observe that any policy towards aliens is vitally
and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters
are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
intervention. 6 7
Nevertheless, in applying the political question doctrine to immigration, the Court has given Congress and the Executive considerable deference without abstaining altogether from judicial review. 68 Under
such a quasi-political question approach, the Court cannot substitute
163. Id at 217.
164. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
165. The subject of illegal immigration requires expertise in nonjudicial areas. See supra
note 159 and accompanying text. Reflecting the view that the judiciary lacks sufficient expertise to judge the prudence of social and economic legislation, the Court subjects such
legislation to minimum scrutiny, unless a suspect class or fundamental right is involved.
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234

(1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
166. Recent polls indicate that as many as 80% of Americans favor policies to reduce
immigration of any kind. Abrams, supra note 57, at 129 n. 127.
167. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
168. See Perry, supranote 63, at 334-35; Note, The Equal Treatment of(Aliens, supra note
56, at 1089; Comment, supra note 146, at 702; Recent Developments, supra note 146, at 209;
see, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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its judgment for the wisdom of Congress or the President. 6 9
Despite the Court's failure to define expressly the scope of limited
judicial review over federal immigration law, 70 recent cases suggest
that a hybrid form of minimum scrutiny has been adopted.' The hypothetical federal statute authorizing states to deny illegal aliens free
public education is premised on possible congressional findings. 77 The
hypothetical findings are legitimate since they lie well within the constitutional bounds of congressional authority over immigration. More
is
important, when Congress asserts an overriding national interest, it 73
presumed that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest.1
State and federal fiscal conservation of government resources for the
benefit of its citizens is a legitimate legislative goal. Denying tuitionfree education to illegal aliens furthers the goal of fiscal austerity because (1) it tends to reduce illegal alien immigration (and thereby its
concomitant costs) and (2) even if the rate of illegal immigration is not
appreciably abated, it relieves the states of the financial burden resulting from educating illegal aliens without requiring tuition. It follows
that a congressional statute authorizing state denial of free public education to illegal aliens is not irrational, and therefore the rational basis
standard of review is amply satisfied. 7 4
169. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977) (the Court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of Congress regarding immigration); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976) (a
narrow standard of review over decisions made by Congress or the President is dictated in
the area of immigration due to political question concerns); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976); Shaughnessy v. Mezi, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893); see also The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra

note 158, at 135-36 n.42.
170. The Supreme Court has imprecisely described the scope of its review over immigration law as limited and narrow. Fiallo,430 U.S. at 796 n.6 (review is "limited"); Mathews,
426 U.S. at 81-82 (review is "narrow").
171. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 103.
172. See supra note 140.

173. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 103. ("[I]f the rule were expressly mandated by Congress or
the President, we might presume that any interest which might rationally be served by the
rule did in fact give rise to its adoption").
174. Contra Note, Equal Protection Clause Requires a Free Public Educationfor Illegal
Alien Children.: Plyler v. Doe, 14 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 531, 546 (1983) (concluding that any

federal classification denying educational benefits to illegal alien children who had been
granted amnesty would be unconstitutional).
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Policy Considerations: Inunigration and Education-The
Need for Judicial Restraint

The Exigencies of Public Education and Immigration Favor Judicial
Deference

The adjudicative proficiency of the Court notwithstanding, it still
lacks the specialized knowledge, expertise, and experience in the fields
of education and immigration to understand fully and weigh intelli-

gently the multitude of social policy concerns that underlie any profitable scrutiny of remedial legislation. In formulating educational policy,
the implied sine qua non includes a congnizance of these socioeconomic
factors, an institutional capacity to investigate the problem adequately,

and a functional ability to generate a solution that placates the political
community. 75 In contrast with the legislative branch, the judiciary
lacks these essential prerequisites for appropriate judicial
76

intervention. 1
The Supreme Court has declared that reviewing educational

legislation
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized
knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local
levels. Education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance,
presents a myriad of77intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems. 1

Similarly, the issue of illegal alien "immigration cuts across a number
of disparate areas of expertise and interests, ranging from the intrica-

cies of immigration law, civil rights, law enforcement, and labor economics to the questions of foreign policy and the balance of
payments."'' 78 Contrary to the permanency of judicial "legislation,"
175. It seems obvious that "the legislature is... a better fact-finding body than an appellate court. The greater number of members and their varied backgrounds and experience
make it virtually certain that the typical legislature will command wider knowledge and
keener appreciation of current social and economic conditions than will the typical court."
Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 209
(1971).
176. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888) (sustaining a state law
prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargarine as dangerous to public health because "[ilt
is
not a part of [the courts'] functions to conduct investigations of facts entering into questions
of public policy"). See generally Cox, supra note 175, at 206-24.
177. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 42 (citing Dandridge,397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
178. Nafziger, An Immigration Policy of Helping Bring People to the Resources, in
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBILC POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO STRATEGIES 93, 102 n.51 (1981) (quoting R. Rochin, Illegal Mexican Aliens in California Agriculture: Some Theoretical Considerations (unpublished paper presented at the First
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the constantly changing character of illegal immigration requires frequent policy re-evaluation and alteration. 179 As a consequence, only

the legislature can reform policy as needed to reflect changing immigration patterns. Judicial decrees and "solutions" to difficult social and
economic policy questions often handicap the legislature in its search
for the most desirable regulatory means. 8 o The Constitution implicitly
recognizes the sound principle that the judiciary should review and not

create legislation."'8 This principle "presumes that, absent some reason
to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely [the Court] may think a
political branch has acted."' 8 2 The Court has consistently held that the
death knell of "Lochnerism" has been sounded, 83 yet under the guise
of equal protection in Plyler, the Court moves disturbingly close to

revival of the judicial paternalism exemplified by that doctrine.
B. Judicial Nonintervention: Analogizing State Prison Regulation to
Illegal Immigration
Many of the policy reasons that support judicial restraint in the
realm of prison administration apply with equal force to the regulation
of illegal aliens. This is not to say that the constitutional rights of illegal aliens and prisoners are entirely congruent, 184 but when social and
International Symposium on the Problems of Migrating Workers from Mexico and the
United States, University of Guadalajara, July 11-14, 1978)).
179. See Nafziger, supra note 178.
180. The Supreme Court has cautioned that "the judiciary is well advised to refrain from
imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to
educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions." San Antonio,
411 U.S. at 43. Cf.Plyler,457 U.S. at 253 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (judicial preemption of
the legislative function causes it to atrophy).
181. Berger, Commentary, "The Supreme Court as a Legislature'"A Dissent,64 CORNELL
L. REV. 988, 993 (1979) (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 266 (1796)).
182. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
183. "Lochnerism" refers to the judicial use of substantive due process to protect economic and property rights through the close scrutiny of economic regulation. This doctrine
was set forth in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Since Lochner, the Court repeatedly has rejected substantive due process as a means by which to protect economic and
property rights. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934). See also P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, supra note 83, at 304; G. GUNTHER, supra
note 21, at 502-34.
184. Illegal aliens and prisoners are denied different constitutional rights. For example,
prisoners have no constitutional right to contact with their families, Oxedine v. Williams,
509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975), whereas illegal aliens have no right to vote or participate in the political community. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1973). Mem-
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economic policy concerns are paramount, judicial incompetence is inherent irrespective of the object of regulation. 185 As recently as 1974,
the Supreme Court recognized the judicial imprudence of intervention
in the area of prison administration:
[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of
resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive
planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government. For all those reasons, courts are illequipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform. Judicial recognition8 6 of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism.1
Five years later, the Court again recognized its own incompetentcy in
the area of prison administration, when it admonished that "[j]udges
. . .have a natural tendency to believe that their individual solutions
to often intractable problems are better and more workable than those
of the persons who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination."' 8 7 These articulated concerns are reminiscent of and equally applicable to legislative
88
responses to the growing illegal alien problem.
Immigration policy ultimately involves similar value judgments
regarding the political, social, economic, and moral consequences of
regulating aliens. 189 Both the prisoner and the illegal alien have broken the law, and although each is entitled to his constitutional rights,
neither may claim all the amenities of citizenship. While not analytically identical to the illegal alien problem, judicial investigation into
the complex problems presented by prisoners is strikingly similar.

Conclusion
Education is not a fundamental right and illegal aliens are not a
suspect class. Consequently, the proper standard of review of state legislation denying illegal aliens free education is the highly deferential
rational basis test. In pursuit of state objectives, including fiscal conservation and the reduction of illegal immigration, the imposition of a
tuition charge on illegal alien children plainly is not irrational. Therebers of both groups, however, have violated the law and as such are not entitled to all of the
constitutional rights ordinarily accorded individuals obedient to the law.
185. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
186. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
187. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
188. See supra notes 167 & 178 and accompanying text.
189. See Seller, supra note 36, at 137.
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fore, the Texas statute survives equal protection attack under minimum
scrutiny. Even assuming that application of intermediate scrutiny to
review the Texas statute was appropriate, the statute was nevertheless
sustainable under this more demanding level of judicial review. When
compared to other measures available to combat the increasing rate of
illegal immigration, the Texas statute appears substantially related to
the achievement of important governmental interests such as fiscal conservation and the improvement of public education. Accordingly, the
Texas statute did not violate equal protection under the heightened
scrutiny standard employed by the majority in Plyler.
When Congress, however, acts within its constitutional power over
immigration to authorize state denial of free education to illegal aliens,
the standard of review is confined to minimum scrutiny. The lack of
judicial competence in the peculiarly complex areas of education and
immigration compounded by the quasi-political question nature of immigration legislation permit no heightened standard of review. A congressional statute authorizing states to deny illegal alien children free
public education should survive equal protection attack.
Few social policy problems are more complex and insoluble than
those resulting from illegal immigration and state regulation of education. A sage judiciary ought to recognize that any legislative attempts
to alleviate these serious problems are forever fused with social, political, economic and policy considerations that are distantly beyond the
judicial province. 90 The Court must also remember that its "view of
the wisdom of a state [statute].

.

.may not color [the] task of constitu-

tional adjudication ...."191 The legislature may be misguided, perhaps even mistaken, but the political process by which it reaches its
decision is far more palatable to the electorate and consonant with our
representative structure of government than countermajoritarian judicial excess. This belief is no less true now than it was when Judge
Learned Hand expressed similar sentiments twenty-five years ago:
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I
assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some
part in the direction of public affairs. Of course, I know how
190. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939); see also Estreicher, Platonic
Guardiansof Democracy: John Hart Ely's Rolefor the Supreme Court in the Constitution's
Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U.L. REv. 547, 575 (1981) ("The Court must ... determine whether
alienage is a valid basis for legislation, and in deciding that issue the Court necessarily refers
to norms other than premises of majoritarian democracy.").
191. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 973 (1982) (plurality opinion).
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illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything;
in the
but nonetheless when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction
192
sense that we are all engaged in a common venture.
It is not the result but the process, not the resolution but the investigation, not the outcome but the struggle to reach an effective political
consensus that are fundamental to our democracy.' 93 Acquiescence to
judicial policymaking inexorably conflicts with the majoritarian legislative process, and this acquiescence is what Judge Learned Hand
found "most irksome." Legislators are not omniscient, nor is their discretion unlimited, but their collective judgment should not be displaced
by judicial review unless when side-by-side with the Constitution the
with the language of the
statute permits no interpretation consistent 194
Constitution and the intent of the Framers.

192. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958); see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 21-22 (1962).

193. It is beyond dispute that "majority rule has been considered the keystone of a democratic political system in both theory and practice." J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 4 (1980).

194. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). However repugnant a statute is in the
eyes of the judiciary, the courts may not "substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 507 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed.
1937).

